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Abstract—A covert communication system is developed that
modulates Morse code characteristics and that delivers its mes-
sage economically and to geographically remote areas using radio
and EchoLink. Our system allows a covert message to be sent
to a receiving individual by hiding it in an existing carrier
Morse code message. The carrier need not be sent directly to
the receiving person, though the receiver must have access to the
signal. Illustratively, we propose that our system may be used as
an alternative means of implementing numbers stations.
I. INTRODUCTION
A potential use for the system we will soon derive is a se-
cure and economical alternative to numbers stations. Numbers
stations can be found throughout the high frequency (HF) radio
band, as the propagation characteristics of this band allows
them to operate over long distances and across broad areas.
The content of these stations consists of a seemingly random
series of numbers or letters, in voice or in Morse code. It
is speculated that these systems are operated by governments
to allow them to communicate securely with covert human
intelligence assets [8]. In this paper we make the assumption
that the presumed purpose of numbers stations is correct, and
suggest an improved, or at least alternative, way of doing the
same thing. If our presumptions are false, and numbers stations
do not serve the role they are widely thought to serve, our sys-
tem may still find utility in covert communication applications
that would benefit from easy covert access to broad and remote
geographical areas. As with numbers stations, the receiver of
our channel (such channels are generally simplex) may remain
very anonymous.
Since our goal is to replace the functionality of numbers
stations, our channel criteria (bandwidth, data-rate, level of se-
curity) should equal or exceed the level of these criteria found
in numbers stations. The carrier communication format we
have selected for our covert channel is CW (Morse code). This
format is used frequently on HF bands for long range commu-
nication due to its resilience against noise, which is prevalent
and somewhat unpredictable in long range HF communication,
and its low bandwidth requirements when compared to Single-
sideband (SSB) or Amplitude Modulation (AM). Traditional
numbers stations utilize SSB or Amplitude Modulation AM
to communicate voice (synthesized or human), or CW to
communicate Morse code. Our channel uses CW and so
occupies less than or approximately equal to the bandwidth
used by numbers stations. The data rate of numbers stations
is presumably low, as the coded message is delivered one
symbol (letter, number) at a time, at a rate suitable for manual
human decoding. Our system has a variable data-rate, and
can emulate a human user, when provided information about
a user’s Morse code statistical behavior. Numbers stations
utilize simplex (one-way) communication, one-time pads, and
long range radio to ensure that both the receiver and message
are anonymous. Our system may be utilized in this fashion,
providing a level of security equal to numbers stations if this
is the desired configuration. Further, our system obfuscates
to some degree the existence of the covert communication;
something that numbers stations are not known to do.
A. Morse Code
Morse code is a simple and durable means of transmitting
symbols (e.g. letters, numbers). It is widely used by amateur
radio operators on HF bands to communicate with one another
over long distances. In typical usage, a carrier of uniform
amplitude and frequency is turned on and off to represent the
Morse code symbols. This is called Continuous Wave (CW)
operation. Morse code requires relatively little bandwidth at
typical speeds [6], and is noise tolerant.
Morse code consists of a standardized set of symbols, which
are represented over the air by short dots and longer dashes.
For example, the letter A is represented by a dot, followed
by a dash. The duration of dots and dashes are proportional
to the speed of the transmission, which is generally measured
in Words per Minute (WPM). A dot is defined as lasting one
time unit. Dashes last three time units. The voids between
elements (dots, dashes) in one symbol (e.g. letter) last one
time unit. The voids between symbols last three time units,
and the voids between words are seven time units long. Using
Morse code, one may transmit any message they’d like via
CW, assuming the receiver has access to the communication,
generally over radio, and that the symbol set is shared between
the transmitter and receiver. In typical usage, operators use the
established Morse code symbol set [3].
B. HF Communication
HF radio communication is used by both amateur radio
operators and governments to communicate over long dis-
tances, and across large geographic areas, as the properties
of HF propagation are amicable to such usage. HF is some-
times referred to as shortwave, especially in the context of
broadcasting. Shortwave broadcasting is sometimes done by
government and news agencies (the BBC World Service being
a prominent example). One who tunes through the HF bands
looking for interesting things to listen to, without the intention
of participating themselves, is a shortwave listener. HF radios
are available at reasonable prices, and throughout the globe,
2so shortwave listening is a fairly popular hobby. A numbers
station recipient may easily obtain a shortwave receiver from
a local electronics market, and the possession of one is not
itself so unusual as to arouse suspicion.
Governments use HF for three primary purposes. First,
HF is used to link facilities and stations together. As HF is
generally not as fast or reliable as other forms of communica-
tion (e.g. the Internet, satellite communications), such systems
are often used as backup or emergency systems. Embassies
often have large, very visible HF antennas on their roofs.
Second, governments use HF for propaganda. HF broadcasting
allows the transmitter to communicate with a distant and broad
geographical area with a single antenna, which maybe located
on friendly soil. Those with shortwave radios may listen to
uncensored news and propaganda anonymously and often in
their native language. Finally, HF is thought to be used to
communicate with undercover human intelligence assets, via
systems such as numbers stations. An agent with a shortwave
radio copies down a code at a predetermined time and day,
and decodes the information using a pre-shared key (e.g. one-
time pad). When a one-time pad is used, the communication is
thought to be entirely secure, as long as an adversary does not
obtain access to the message recipient or the one-time-pad.
The quality of HF communication is dependent on several
factors, some being the weather and the time of day. To main-
tain relatively high levels of reliability over long distances,
careful planning, powerful transmitters, and large antennas are
sometimes necessary. So, while HF serves a definite purpose,
it is not always an optimal solution. Our covert system may
use HF, as in traditional numbers stations, but this need not be
the case. If HF resources are not accessible or optimal for the
transmitting individual, a system such as EchoLink can be used
to deliver the covert and encoded message to the recipient.
C. EchoLink
Echolink [5] is a service that registered amateur radio
operators can use for free. EchoLink allows part (or all)
of the communication path between amateur operators to
occur over the Internet, using Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) protocols. For example, an amateur operator, having
registered with the service, may communicate with another
ham across the globe, using their relatively short ranged Ultra
High Frequency / Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) hand-held
radio, computer, or cell phone [1]. An EchoLink station will
receive their radio communication, translate it to VoIP, and
send it to the recipient EchoLink station, which will translate
the communication back to Radio Frequency (RF) and send it
over the air to the recipient.
There are thousands of EchoLink nodes currently deployed
around the world, giving the user radio transmit capability
to many geographic areas from the comfort of their living
room (or military base, or secret facility). The number of
stations in a given area depends on the population density and
standard of living in the area, as well as the amicability of the
area’s governing entity to amateur radio activity. The EchoLink
website [5] allows anyone to locate nodes in a given area. As
of this writing, most nodes use VHF/UHF, though a few report
to use HF, and so one may conceive that the advantages of
HF propagation might be used in conjunction with EchoLink
or a similar system [4] to allow the user to areas both far and
broad.
II. OUR CHANNEL
With the above tools to some degree understood, we com-
bine them to create a system that is part covert channel, part
numbers station-style secured broadcast system. That is, we
devise a method to communicate over broad geographical
areas, with the message obscured. Even if the existence of the
covert message is identified, it cannot be easily deciphered.
Our system is proof of concept: our channel has been devel-
oped and tested, but no significant mathematical analysis or
derivation has been attempted, and legal restrictions limit our
ability to test over amateur radio channels [2].
Our channel as described here makes use of technologies
such as EchoLink, VHF/UHF radio, and perhaps HF. The
concept is flexible enough that it may be used over existing
operator infrastructure (e.g. the HF radio assets governments
own and may already be using for traditional numbers sta-
tions), or other long-range radio networks such as the Internet
Radio Linking Project (IRLP) [4]. We use EchoLink here
because it provides easy and economical access to many
diverse geographical areas. We would sometimes like to use
HF over EchoLink, and would if such stations where available,
though they seem to be rare or nonexistent at this time.
Our channel modulates CW, providing in effect Morse
code over Morse code. We do this by varying the statistical
properties of the overt (carrier) Morse code communication.
As microcontroller assisted keying has become more common,
the statistical properties of Morse code have become more
uniform. In particular, the standard deviation of carrier keying
times have been lowered. In our channel we are forced to
make one more assumption: our carrier communication is
presumably formed by a traditional electromechanical key,
where the tone length (and associated statistics) are directly
controlled by the time the key is depressed, which is directly
controlled by the very imperfect (in terms of milliseconds)
human operator.
Since our channel is Morse code modulated on Morse code,
and we send an element (dot, dash) with each element of the
carrier message, our channel speed is about the same as the
carrier keying speed, measured in words per minute. At this
time, we have already seen the following desirable properties
of our covert channel:
• Our channel is to some degree covert. Observers see the
carrier Morse code communication, whose contents are
innocuous. The carrier message can be formed naturally
by communicating with an amateur radio operator, and by
answering his questions or inquiring about his activities.
This other radio operator is unaware that our responses
and inquiries carry covert data: to all receivers but our
own decoding software, the carrier message is not un-
usual.
• Our channel is sufficiently fast that it can be used for
the purpose of sending coded characters “to the field”.
3That is, it operates at CW and its associated speeds, as
do many numbers stations.
• Our channel is noise resilient. Morse code is used by
amateur radio operators wanting to communicate over
large distances in part because of this property. Also, our
channel relatively little bandwidth [6].
• Finally, our covert channel carrier is quite innocuous.
One may find many Morse code conversations over the
amateur radio bands at any given time. Adding our needle
to this haystack won’t raise any eyebrows, assuming we
don’t behave aberrantly on our carrier.
The channel transmitter and receiver share three things:
knowledge of the time and location of transmission, a seed or
use with a Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG), and
the transmitter’s base keying statistics. The time and location
of transmission is knowledge also required by recipients of
traditional numbers stations; one may not decode what they
cannot find. Numbers stations also require the receiver to have
the key, or one-time pad, available for decoding the message.
We suggest that our PRNG seed may double as a one-time
pad, with arbitrary long pads derived by inputting the PRNG
into a message digest algorithm. It is conceivable that using
the PRNG seed as a key may compromise the anonymity of
the message, a consideration that must be weighed during the
design of a particular channel implementation.
These previous two items, the time and location of trans-
mission, and PRNG (one-time pad), are pre-shared both in
our system, as well as in traditional numbers stations. Our
channel also requires the receiver to know some information
about the transmitter’s keying statistics. This information can
be pre-shared, or it can be derived during a pre-arranged
training period, during which the transmitter communicates
unmodulated messages to unwary amateur operators, and the
receiver unobtrusively listens and derives statistics from the
transmission. The required statistics are the dot and dash
time averages, and their standard deviations. Note that in
our example implementation, our deterministic transmitter (a
Python script) emulates human statistical behavior by taking as
input the averages and standard deviations of a human user’s
keying times.
With the transmitter and receiver aware of the element
statistics of the pending conversation, and in possession of the
seed, covert transmission may begin. If EchoLink is used to
economically carry the message, the transmitting individual
selects an EchoLink node in the vicinity of the recipient.
The transmitter then calls CQ, and talks to whomever will
answer. The receiver records the transmitter’s conversations,
and when they have ended, decodes them. For each element
(dot, dash) of the overt transmit message, an element duration
is taken from a normal distribution with the element average
time as its mean. As the transmitter and receiver PRNGs share
the same seed, they both know what duration each element
should have. Deviation from the pre-shared durations convey
the covert message. The use of a shared PRNG seed and
statistical distributions to aid in covert communication was
discussed in my previous work on web read-time modulation
[9].
The symbols for the covert message are conveyed by
shifting the pseudo-random symbol time up, perhaps by one
standard deviation, to represent a covert dot, and down to
represent a covert dash. To represent the end of a letter, symbol
time is left at its PRNG generated time. As the averages and
standard deviations are taken from real human CW messages,
as a PRNG is used to generate the particular symbol times,
and as the offsets are constrained to some maximum time (e.g.
one standard deviation), the channel’s symbol times appear
innocuous to those who may happen to be quantifying the
carrier message’s statistics. That is, observers do not have the
PRNG seed, and they cannot determine whether the symbol
times have gone up or down from the shared reference.
III. SOME CONSIDERATIONS
The covert channel recipient must have decoding software.
If they are familiar with the implementation specifics, coding
such a receiver is not prohibitively difficult. It is speculated
that poly-tone numbers stations exist [7]. Such stations have
the potential to transmit information at a higher rate than
stations based on voice or CW. That they are not used exclu-
sively is probably due to their increased bandwidth and lower
noise resilience compared to voice and CW transmissions,
and the necessity that the receiver posses specialized decoding
software.
Like numbers stations, our channel operates in simplex
(one-way) mode, and the recipient probably cannot be identi-
fied as the carrier traffic covers a broad area, which probably
contains many individuals. Security of the covert transmission
is dependent on the strength of the encryption. It is said that
one-time pads provide perfect anonymity of a message, though
this may be to some degree compromised if the PRNG doubles
as the pad. The existence of the covert communication is
secure to the degree that realistic user behavior is emulated.
For manual electromechanical keying, the standard deviation
of symbols should be high enough that we may modulate
symbol time without arising suspicion, when a PRNG and
normal distribution are used as previously mentioned.
EchoLink requires registration. This suggests that an indi-
vidual may be associated with the transmission. Though this
may seem dangerous, there are mitigating factors. First, the
covert message is difficult to identify, and so the transmitting
individual should incur no suspicion. Second, if the channel
is used in the context of traditional numbers stations, which
are presumably operated by governments, obtaining a false
amateur radio license should not be a problem. Finally, if
it is determined that EchoLink is too risky for a particular
transmission, other assets or networks may be used to transmit
the covert message. Other assets would also be used when
there is not an EchoLink node in range of the recipient.
Multipath propagation may affect the duration of the signal
at the receiver and undermine the accuracy of the channel. To
compensate, the code deviation time may be increased where
multipath will cause problems. One should examine to what
extent increasing the code deviation undermines the statistical
correctness, and thus covertness, of the channel. Fortunately
the statistics in question vary from individual to individual, so
one may simply emulate a slower keyer when addressing this
4issue. As standard deviations may be in multiple milliseconds,
multipath effects may presumably be overcome without much
effort. When digital systems such as EchoLink exist in the
communication path, sampling also compromises the accuracy
of the channel. The duration of an element is rounded to
conform with sampling. In the case of 8kHz sampling, the
time slots are 125µs long, and standard deviations in the order
of milliseconds should overcome this. The digital filter used
in the receiver software may also have an effect on recovered
symbol duration at the receiver.
Our implementation uses a sliding window in the decoder to
overcome attenuation and noise in the radio path. For example,
a signal will be thought to exist throughout a window if
any point in that window rises above a threshold. For noisy
signals this window size is increased, for example to three
carrier frequency cycles in width. An increased window size
decreases the accuracy of the recovered element durations, as
the entire window is deduced to be on, or off. Again, this effect
is not major, though when combined with the considerations
above a significant deviation may exist. One may increase
element time standard deviation to overcome this, though as
previously mentioned this may undermine the security of the
channel. Further, at a certain point the standard deviation may
become so high that the use of a PRNG and normal distribution
becomes irrelevant, as the derived element times are often
either very high or very low with respect to an average or
even reasonable value.
While HF, EchoLink, and numbers stations are used here
to illustrate the channel, they certainly do not comprise the
necessary structure or limitations of our channel. Alternatives
include the use of amateur radio satellites, and reception
by web streaming (many repeaters have an online listening
feature.) Numbers stations are a fine illustrative vehicle for this
channel, though use for it may certainly be found elsewhere.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Our proof of concept implementation was first written as a
general Morse code encoder and decoder, and later extended
to include the covert channel described here. It was written
in Python, and is available from http://covert.codes. Our im-
plementation modifies Morse code symbol time as described
above, with some particulars. When a symbol time is selected
from a normal distribution with the pseudo-random duration as
its mean, the time is wrapped around via a modulo operation so
that it does not fall outside one standard deviation. A standard
deviation above the derived duration conveys a dot, and a
standard deviation below conveys a dash. No change conveys
letter demarcation, and durations of two standard deviations
from the mean are used to signal the end of a word.
V. EXPERIMENT
Several local experiments were run at the development
site to ensure that the transmitter and receiver were able to
communicate covert data over a seemingly innocuous carrier
message. One of these tests is shown after the conclusion. In
this experiment, both dot and dash standard deviations were set
to be 10ms, dot average length was 60ms, and dash average
length was 180ms. The trailing noise (characters that occur
after the message) may be removed by arranging for a higher,
singular high code deviation to indicate end of message,
though the presence of noise after the message deviations
have ceased may indicate that the standard deviation was not
high enough for the particular test. In the demonstration test
we show the receiver first decoding the carrier Morse code
message, then show it also decoding the covert message. Our
software, which can be found at http://covert.codes, is still
under development and so replication of this experiment may
yield different results.
Comprehensive radio tests were not undertaken due to
[2], and we request the aid of anyone who can legally test
our system over radio paths. Until radio testing has been
undertaken, and the software adjusted in accordance with
subsequent findings, this covert channel remains a work in
progress.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have theorized a covert channel that may be able to
convey its covert payload anonymously and quite securely to
distant and broad geographical areas. The channel is flexible,
in that it may utilize existing long-range (e.g. HF radio)
communication systems, or free systems such as EchoLink
to carry its message economically. Should EchoLink not
be an appropriate vehicle for a given implementation, other
systems such as IRLP exist that may be able to fill the role.
Other vehicles for the channel (satellite, web streaming) are
speculated to be useful as well. The channel is shown to work
in software, where the output of the transmitter is fed directly
into the receiver, but meaningful radio tests have yet to be
conducted due to [2].
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